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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XV FEBRUARY, 1930 No. 2
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF TRANSFERS NOT TAK-
ING PLACE AT DEATH
BY HARRY W. KROEGER
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The law of property recognizes as transfers taking place at
death the passing of property by will or descent. Did govern-
ments confine the incidence of their various so-called inheritance
taxes, to such transfers, no constitutional problems would arise
respecting the transfers subject to the tax. On the other hand,
were the incidence of the tax so confined, the efficacy of the tax
would be much reduced. It would not require even an astute
lawyer to point out the manner in which inheritance taxes could
be circumvented without sacrifice to the owners of property of
the advantages of testamentary disposition.
To prevent circumvention of the inheritance tax laws, govern-
ments have sought to extend the purview of their taxing
statutes beyond transfers taking place at death as known to the
law of property, and have imposed the tax upon certain types of
transfers not taking place at the death of the owner. The at-
'The term "inheritance tax" is employed with a feeling of apology.
Philologically the word "inheritance" connotes devolution by intestate suc-
cession, and seems inappropriate to apply to a class of transfers which em-
braces not only transfers by will but certain transfers inter vivos which
have been held subject to the tax. On the other hand no other current ex-
pression is entirely satisfactory. It seems preferable to reserve the terms
"succession tax" and "estate tax," respectively, in order to distinguish be-
tween t4e type of legislation, enacted by most of the states, which imposes
the tax on the privilege of the beneficiary to succeed to the property, and
the type of legislation, exemplified by the Federal Estate Tax Law, which
imposes the tax on the privilege of transmitting the property.
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tempted extensions may be embraced under four heads, to in-
clude: (1) transfers with powers of revocation reserved, (2)
transfers with possession and enjoyment of the property post-
poned to the death of the donor, (3) transfers made in contem-
plation of death, and (4) transfers made by virtue of powers of
appointment. How far these extensions are, or are not, so
arbitrary and confiscatory as to violate the due process clauses
contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Federal Constitution is the topic of this paper.
Viewed from the angle of general taxation, it will be readily
observed that the inclusion of transfers not taking place at death
in a scheme of inheritance taxation, involves the transposition
of such transfers from the potential field of gift taxation into
the field of inheritance taxation. The particular governmental
authority imposing the inheritance tax may not have a gift tax.
But this of itself would not justify subjecting to inheritance
taxation such transfers inter vivos as bear no kinship to in-
heritances.
Underlying the decisions relating to inheritance taxation are
two fundamental theories: the first, that inheritance is a
privilege and not a natural right,2 the second, that an inheri-
tance tax is a tax upon that privilege and not a tax upon prop-
erty passing in inheritance. 3 In these theories lies not only the
justification for the tax, but also the justifications for the classi-
fication and discrimination in inheritance taxation, held to be
not violative of the equal protection and due process clauses. 4
One of the discriminations so justified is that of progressive or
graduated taxationA
While it had been suggested by Mr. Justice McReynolds, in
Schlesinger v. WisconsinG that graduated taxation could not
'Magoon v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (1898) 170 U. S. 283;
Knowlton v. Moore (1900) 178 U. S. 41 (federal succession tax of 1898).
'Supra, note 2. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (1921) 256 U. S. 345.
For a recent statement of the theory, see Stebbins v. Riley (1925) 268
U. S. 137, 141.
4 c. f. Magoon v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, supra, note 2; Billings
v. Illinois (1903) 188 U. S. 97; Maxwell v. Bugbee (1919) 250 U. S. 525;
Stebbins v. Riley, supra, note 3.
'Supra, note 2.
(1926) 270 U. S. 230, 1. c. 240.
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properly be laid on all gifts, nor upon any gift without testa-
mentary character, the law appears to be fixed to the contrary
in Bromley v. McCaughn.7 That case, which involved the gift
tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1924, characterized the
gift tax as one laid upon the exercise by an owner of property
of a single one of those powers incident to the ownership, name-
ly, the power to give the property owned to another. Thus, the
tax is not a direct tax upon property but an excise upon a par-
ticular use of it. As such, the tax was held not violative of the
provisions of the Federal Constitution forbidding unapportioned
direct taxation by the United States, and also not violative of the
due process clause, contained in the Fifth Amendment, even
though the tax be a progressive or graduated tax. The char-
acteristics of gift taxation are thus assimilated to the character-
istics of inheritance taxation.
Let us now assume that governmental authority should at-
tempt to measure a tax imposed at the death of the owner by
the value of the property which passes by virtue of his will or
intestate succession, plus the value of all property which he may
have given away at any time during his life, whether subject to
reservations or not, and whether in contemplation of death or
not. The effect of such tax under a scheme of progressive or
graduated taxation would be to impose a larger aggregate tax
than could or would be exacted if the property passing at death
were separately taxed and the gifts made during lifetime were
separately taxed.
It has never been seriously contended that such a conjunctive
tax could be sustained. In fact, the thing has been attempted
only in the classes of transfers herein discussed. To the extent,
however, that total inclusion of gifts with transfers taking place
at death in a single scheme of taxation would be invalid, the
partial inclusions herein discussed would be invalid unless they
bear a kinship to inheritance which justifies their transposition
' (1929) 50 Sup. Ct. 46; cf. Blodgett v. Holden (1927) 275 U. S. 142,
and Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 UI. S. 440, where the opinions
were confined to a consideration of the retrospective operation of the Rev-
enue Act of 1924. Congress had attempted by that act, which was not ap-
proved until June 2, 1924, to tax gifts made at any time during that year.
As to gifts made prior to the effective date of the act, the court declared
the tax invalid.
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from the class of gifts generally into the class of transfers tak-
ing place at death.
It will be submitted in the course of this paper that the trans-
position of any class of gifts inter vivos into the field of inher-
itance taxation must be justified, as has been suggested by Mr.
Justice McReynolds, in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, by their testa-
mentary character. To include a gift not having testamentary
character, would subject it to rates of taxation which have no
relation to the value of the gift, but are determined by the
value of other property subjected properly to such taxation.
By a disposition having testamentary character there must be
meant something both more and less than a disposition made
with testamentary intent. The absence of such intent will be
found to be immaterial in the face of the rule, which will be
presently examined, that gifts subject to revocation may be sub-
jected to inheritance taxes. The presence of such intent would
not matter if the gift were in every respect absolute and made
without contemplation of immediate death from a presently
existing condition. Probably what Mr. Justice McReynolds
meant by the expression "testamentary character" was objective
and not subjective, viz., if the disposition, by reason of surround-
ing circumstances or in accordance with its own terms, accom-
plishes substantially the same result as would have been ac-
complished by a will, it has testamentary character. If a dispo-
sition have such character its inclusion by governmental au-
thority within the same class with transfers taking place at
death, for purposes of taxation, would not be wholly arbitrary.
Before proceeding to an examination of the specific classes of
dispositions inter vivos, which governments have sought to sub-
ject to inheritance taxation, an additional foreword should be
interposed respecting the treatment of the two types of inheri-
tance taxes. Mr. Justice Stone in the opinion in Stebbins v.
Riley8 said:
"There are two elements in every transfer of a decedent's
estate; the one is the exercise of the legal power to transmit
at death; the other is the privilege of succession. Each as
we have seen is the subject of taxation."
'Supra, note 3, 1. c. 144.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/1
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF TRANSFERS
Depending upon whether the tax is upon the privilege of trans-
mission by the decedent, or upon the privilege of the various
beneficiaries to succeed to the property, it is called an estate tax
or a succession tax. Despite the fact that there is some inco-
herence between the estate tax and the succession tax cases, it
seems clear that for every transmission by a decedent to a bene-
ficiary there is a succession by the beneficiary, and if in any
given instance an estate tax is held constitutionally permissible,
a succession tax ought to be held valid when a similar state of
facts appears. Therefore, throughout this paper estate tax
cases and succession tax cases are grouped under the same
headings.
II. TRANSFERS WITH POWERS OF REVOCATION RESERVED
The earliest case in the Supreme Court of the United States
on the subject of powers of revocation in inheritance taxation,
was Bullen v. Wisconsin.9 There a fund had been placed by a
resident of Wisconsin in trust with a Chicago trust company for
the donor's widow and children, the donor reserving a general
power of revocation and the disposition of the income of the
trust estate during his life. Upon the death of the donor, the
state assessed a succession tax on the trust estate contending
that the general power of disposition reserved by the donor was
equivalent to a fee for the purposes of taxation. The latter con-
tention was sustained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and
the constitutionality of such a tax was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The opinion of the Court by Mr.
Justice Holmes is based wholly upon the reserved power of revo-
cation. It was said :1
The ultimate limitations would operate unless revoked,
which they were not. But Bullen as has been seen, re-
served an absolute power of control over all of his gifts,
and exercised it during his life by a revocation, (followed,
to be sure, by a reconveyance upon the same terms) and by
taking all the income of the fund. The words of Lord St.
Leonards apply with full force to the present attempt to
escape the Wisconsin inheritance tax:- "To take a distinc-
tion between a general power and a limitation in fee is to
grasp at a shadow, while the substance escapes."
"' Supra, note 9, 1. c. 630.
- (1916) 240 U. S. 625.
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In connection with the Bullen case, the recent case of Salton-
stall v. Saltonstall 1 should be considered. The facts there pre-
sented were as follows: One Peter C. Brooks, a resident of
Massachusetts, on various dates between 1905 and 1907 trans-
ferred certain property upon trusts reserving a life estate in the
income, and providing for termination in whole or in part by
the donor acting with the concurrence of one of the trustees. In
1919 the trust was altered so as to provide for the accumulation
of the income during the donor's lifetime. The applicable suc-
cession tax statute of Massachusetts was enacted in 1909, con-
taining a provision for the taxation of transfers of property
passing by failure of appointment. A later statutory amend-
ment, enacted in 1916, reached transfers "made or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment after death." The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the power of the
state to tax with respect to the trust property on the death of
Mr. Brooks, basing its decision upon the reservation of the
power of revocation (this being regarded as equivalent to a
power of appointment, the failure to exercise which brought the
case within the 1909 statute), and also upon the postponement
of the possession and enjoyment of the beneficiaries until after
the death of the donor. In affirming the decision of the state
court, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Stone, based its decision almost exclusively upon the
reservation of the power :12
. . the gift taxed is not one long since completed, but
one which never passed to the beneficiaries beyond recall,
until the death of the donor; and the value of the gift at that
operative moment, rather than at some later date, is the
basis of the tax.
A power of appointment reserved by the donor
leaves the transfer, as to him, incomplete and subject to tax.
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625. The beneficiary's acquisi-
tion of the property is equally incomplete whether the
power be reserved to the donor or another.
Bullen v. Wisconsin and Saltonstal v. Saltonstall attain this
result: So long as a transfer is subject to be defeated, prior to
the donor's death, whether by power reserved to the donor or
u (1928) 276 U. S. 260. '2 Supra, note 11, 1. c. 271.
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given to a third person, a constitutionally taxable succession oc-
curs at the time of the donor's death. According to the general
rules of property law, the title of the trustee and the rights of
the beneficiaries of a revocable trust take effect as of the time
the trust settlement is made. Yet the technical rules of vesti-
ture cannot be invoked to impose a constitutional limitation on
state power. If in practical effect, a disposition inter vivos be
tentative until the death of the donor, and if it become final and
indefeasible only when the event of death occurs, then the donor
has made a disposition which practically accomplishes the same
result as if he had embraced his disposition in the form of a will.
Such a disposition may fairly be considered as having testa-
mentary character. Differently stated, at the moment of the
donor's death, the rights under the deed of settlement become
fixed, and this fixation of rights is a proper object of succession
taxation. It is consistent with such a theory to hold, as the
court in the Saltonstall case did hold, that the value of the prop-
erty at the time of the donor's death is the measure of the tax,
for at that time the fixation of rights occurs.
The limits of the rule of the Bullen and Saltonstall cases are
expressed in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company,13 a case
which arose under the estate tax provisions of the Revenue Act
of 1921. This case involved two trusts by the terms of which
the settlor reserved the income for life and the power at any
time to revoke. The case also involved four other trusts made
by the same settlor by the terms of each of which life interests
in the income were created terminable five years after the
settlor's death, or on the death of the respective life beneficiaries,
whichever should take place first, with remainders over. The
settlor retained right of supervision of the investment of each of
the trusts and the power exercisable jointly with the respective
beneficiaries to alter, change or modify. Upon the settlor's death
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in fixing the amount of
the estate for tax purposes included the value of the corpus of
all of the trusts mentioned. His authority for so doing was as-
serted to be Section 402 of the Revenue Act of 1921 which di-
rected the inclusion in the gross estate of a decedent for tax pur-
poses of all property of which the decedent made a transfer "in-
(1929) 278 U. S. 339.
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tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death." Suit was brought to recover the tax exacted with re-
spect to the trust property. The Court followed its earlier de-
cisions so far as the two trusts were concerned but declared the
tax invalid as to the other four. In the course of its considera-
tion of the latter it held that where the power of revocation or
alteration was dependent upon the consent of the beneficiary,
the transfer was as complete, as if there had been an absolute
gift. The fact that the donor's death determined the shifting of
interests from life tenant to remainderman was regarded as
immaterial, and it was said that the character of estates created
did not affect their taxability, as long as the entire beneficial
interest of the settlor had passed under the deed of settlement.
It is of interest to note that the Supreme Court has in the
three cases cited sustained a tax on gifts subject to revocation
under three different sources of taxing authority, viz.: (a)
where there was a general succession tax statute and by the
rule of construction of the supreme court of the state a re-
served power of disposition was considered the equivalent of a
fee; (b) where the taxing statute contained a provision for the
inclusion of transfers passing by failure of appointment; and
(c) where the taxing statute prescribed the inclusion of trans-
fers taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
It does not follow, however, from the fact that a transfer inter
vivos with power of revocation reserved to the donor is con-
stitutionally taxable, that a governmental authority has prop-
erly exercised the taxing power. Thus it has been held by state
courts that the mere reservation of a power of appointment
does not make a transfer taxable under the postponement of
"possession or enjoyment,' 14 nor under the "contemplation of
death,"'15 clauses of the various state statutes. These decisions,
it is submitted, are unaffected by the Saltonstall case, for they
concern the interpretation of the statutes, not their constitu-
"
tNickel v. State (1919) 43 Nev. 12, affirmed (1921) 256 U. S. 222; Re
Massery (1899) 28 App. Div. 580, 159 N. Y. 532; In re Patterson (1911)
146 App. Div. 286, 204 N. Y. 677; Re Miller (1923) 236 N. Y. 290, 237 N. Y.
524; Re Dolan (1924) 279 Pa. 582. But see Re Bostwick (1899) 160 N. Y.
489.
People v. Northern Trust Company (1919) 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662,
7 A. L. R. 709.
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tionality. In such matters, of course, the decisions of the state
courts are final.-6
The rule affirming the constitutional power under inheritance
tax statutes to tax gifts subject to revocation has been extended
to include insurance policies, by the terms of which the insured
reserves the right to change beneficiaries, in the recent case of
Chase National Bank v. United States.17
III. TRANSFERS WITH POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT POSTPONED
UNTIL UPON OR AFTER DEATH
Inheritance tax statutes frequently contain provisions subject-
ing to such taxation as part of a decedent's estate property
transferred by the decedent subject to postponement of enjoy-
ment or possession until upon or after his death. As observed
in the course of our discussion of transfers subject to revocation,
the latter have sometimes,18 but not always,19 been held taxable
by virtue of those statutory provisions. Under this subdivision
of our subject, however, we shall treat postponement of posses-
sion and enjoyment as referring to an absolute gift subject to
reservations by the donor of some estate in the property rather
than of a mere power.
Were there total lack of authority on the subject, it might be
well contended that a tax imposed at the death of the donor upon
interests already vested but then coming into the possession of
the beneficiaries, would not be a proper object for succession
taxation. It is difficult to discern what operative event occurs,
at the time of the donor's death, to effect a disposition akin to
testamentary disposition. In the power of revocation case death
terminates the right of the donor to substitute a testamentary
disposition for the disposition made inter vivos, and the failure
to make such substitution is tantamount to the dying will of
the donor that his settlement stand. But in the instance now
contemplated, the very effect of the settlement is to pass irrev-
ocably the interests acquired by the beneficiaries, and the act
of transfer divests the donor of all power to make testamentary
disposition of the property transferred. From the moment of
the transfer, it is the creditors of the beneficiary, and, in the
Nickel v. State (1921) 256 U. S. 222. 'Supra, note 13.
(1929) 278 U. S. 327. "Supra, note 14.
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absence of fraud in the transfer, not the creditors of the donor,
who may proceed against the property. Because the possession
or enjoyment of the property by the beneficiaries is postponed
until the death of the donor, it cannot be said that this effects
the transfer to them any more than such postponement until
the death of the King of England or until thirty years after the
gift.
20
That a transfer inter vivos with reservation of a life interest
is subject to a succession tax upon the death of the donor was
determined in Keeney v. New York, 21 where a New York tax
was sustained as to property transferred inter vivos upon a re-
vocable trust in which the donor reserved a life interest. Un-
like Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin, Mr. Justice La-
mar in the Keeney case treated the problem entirely from the
standpoint of the postponement of "enjoyment and possession"
clause of the New York statute:
In the present instance, and so far as the 14th Amendment
is concerned, the state could put transfers intended to take
effect at the death of the grantor in a class with transfers
by descent, will, or gifts in contemplation of death of the
donor, without, at the same time, taxing transfers intended
to take effect on the death of some person other than the
grantor, or on the happening of a certain or contingent
event.
Nowhere in the opinion does the court say that a taxable succes-
sion takes place upon the death of the donor, but the opinion
gives one the impression that the court treats gratuitous trans-
fers generally as taxable and affirms the right of the state to
make a classification based upon the reservation of a life interest
in the donor. May it be said that the real incidence of the tax
is the transfer at the time of the gift, and not a succession
taking place at the death of the donor? That because this type
of gift tax and the succession tax have a statutory purpose in
common, the collection may be made at the time of the donor's
death?
Nichols 'v. Coolidge,22 a case under the estate tax provisions of
the Revenue Act of 1919, will, it is believed, throw light on
Cf. Shukert v. Allen (1927) 273 U. S. 545.
(1912) 222 U. S. 525.
- (1927) 274 U. S. 531.
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the subject. A husband and wife, prior to the enactment of a
federal estate tax law, conveyed property upon trusts, income
to be paid to themselves during their joint lives and to the sur-
vivor of them during his or her life, corpus thereafter to be dis-
tributed to their children or the representatives of the children.
In 1917 the donors relinquished their life interests in the trust.
The Act contained a postponement of "possession or enjoy-
ment" provision applicable, by its terms, to conveyances made
before as well as after the enactment. Under this provision the
government collected a tax at the death of Mrs. Coolidge, in-
cluding in its computation of the gross estate the value of the
property belonging to the trust estate, and the executors sued to
recover such portion of the tax as was measured by the value
of the trust property. The Supreme Court declared that portion
of the tax invalid. The contention of the government that the
gifts with reservation of life interests were testamentary in ef-
fect and might be properly treated as taxable on the death of the
owner, was disposed of by the Court as follows :23
But the conveyance by Mrs. Coolidge to trustees was in
no proper sense testamentary, and it bears no substantial
relationship to the transfer by death.
The court thereupon declared that so far as the statute related
to transfers made prior to its passage, it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious and amounts to confiscation." The opinion concluded with
the following remarks :24
Whether or how far the challenged provision is valid in
respect of transfers made subsequent to the enactment, we
need not now consider.
The case might conceivably have turned on the proposition
that the relinquishment by the donors of their life estates re-
moved the transfer from the operation of the postponement of
possession or enjoyment clause of the statute. This proposition
was, however, not discussed by the Supreme Court, and, inas-
much as the District Court2 5 treated the transfer as one in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
Supra, note 22, 1. c. 540.
Supra, note 22, 1. c. 543.
m Coolidge v. Nichols (D. C. D. Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112, 1. c. 116.
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death within the meaning of the Act of 1918, the Supreme Court
must be presumed to have acquiesced in such treatment and to
have rendered its decision upon the assumption that the case
fell within the statute.2  Such being the case, the only possible
interpretation of the decision is that where a gift inter vivos
constitutes a complete gift of the remainder interests, the
operative moment of transfer is, for taxing purposes, as for
purposes of title, at the date of the settlement. If it were other-
wise, what difference would it make whether the settlement
was before or after the enactment of the statute? So interpreted
the case is consistent with Saltonstal v. Saltonstall, for, where
the donor has reserved a power of revocation, his death and
not the donation has the operative effect of making the trans-
fer absolute, and it would be immaterial whether the taxing
statute had existed at the time of the donation .or not.
But what becomes of Keeney ,v. New York? To uphold both
the Nichols case and the Keeney case, it is necessary to say (1)
that the incidence of the tax under the postponement of "pos-
session and enjoyment" clauses is not at the time of the donor's
death but at the time of the gift, (2) that a tax on the gift and
a tax on the inheritance may be conjunctively imposed, because
there is a statutory purpose common to both types of taxation,
(3) provided that if the gift antecedes the enactment of the
taxing statute, the transfer is free of the burden. Such a con-
struction of the case is forced to say the least.
It will be noted that the court in Nichols v. Coolidge does not
seek to avoid the constitutional issue by giving a narrow con-
struction to the postponement of "possession and enjoyment"
clause. It assumes that that statute meant to affect cases where
the remainders, though vested, "fell in" at the death of the
"That the Supreme Court's decision would stand, irrespective of the re-
linquishment feature of the case, would seem to be confirmed by Cleveland
Trust Company v. Routzahan (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1925) 7 F. (2d) 483, (C.
C. A. 6, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 1009. In that case there was involved a
transfer subject to life estates reserved by the donor, and there was no
relinquishment of the life estates. The District Court considered Cool-
idge v. Nichols, which had then been decided by the District Court in Mass-
achusetts, and distinguished it on the ground that the relinquishment of the
life estates in the Coolidge case effected a completed transfer. However,
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court,
upon the authority of Nichols v. Coolidge, as decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
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donor. Nor does the court invoke the doctrine of "unappor-
tioned direct taxes." Its decision is based on the "arbitrary"
nature of the tax, a vice under the "due process" clause of the
Fifth Amendment. If a given tax imposed by the United States
be arbitrary under the Fifth Amendment, a similar tax imposed
by a state ought to be arbitrary under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it seems that Nichols v. Coolidge, and any extensions
of its doctrine, ought to control state inheritance tax cases even
to the extent of cutting in upon Keeney v. New York, unless it
can be said that there is a substantial difference in nature be-
tween the estate tax and a state succession tax.
The opinion in the Saltonstall case distinguishes that case
from the Coolidge case on the further ground that the tax in
the former is on succession while the tax in the latter is on
transmission. It is rather difficult to comprehend a distinction
between a transmission tax and a succession tax which would
warrant a difference in the rule as to taxation of completed
gifts (though life estates be reserved). For, if the transmission
is complete, so also is the vestiture in the beneficiaries. But let
us speculate. If the distinction continues to be recognized, there
is a possibility that it will be held that a transfer inter vivos,
made after the enactment of the statute, is not taxable under
the federal estate tax law merely because the donor reserved a
life estate, for the authority of Keeney v. New York would not
extend to transmission taxes.
Before proceeding with any further prognosis, however, an
additional thought should be introduced. Assuming that the
operative moment of transfer (in the case of a settlement with
life interest reserved) is, for estate tax purposes, the date of the
settlement, the valuation of the property subject to the settle-
ment should be as of that date and not as of the date of the
donor's death. Consistently with Nichols v. Coolidge, the Su-
preme Court ought to hold unconstitutional that provision of the
estate tax law2 7 which includes the value at the time of a donor's
death of property transferred to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after his death.28 Support for such a contention
U. S. Compiled Statutes, §6336-5/8 b-§6336-5/8 h, 26 N. S. C. 1094 et
seq.
' See discussion of this feature in note (1926) 40 HARV. L. Rv. 118
which appeared before the decision of Nichols v. Coolidge.
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may be found in the concurring opinion of Judge Hand in Frew
v. Bowers.
29
This matter of the time of valuation has not been decided by
the Supreme Court, and it would not be at all surprising to ob-
serve further extension of the constitutional limitations of Con-
gressional power. Should such extension take place, Keeney V.
New York would probably be circumvented, as it was dismissed
from discussion in the Saltonstall case, on the basis of the dis-
tinction between transmission and succession taxes. Whether
the distinction be valid or not, it would remain true that ac-
cording to the present reasoning of the Supreme Court, the suc-
cessions taxed by the states under the postponement of "posses-
sion and enjoyment" clauses of their taxing statutes are not
testamentary successions.
Keeney v. New York is probably, so far as it relates to suc-
cession taxes, stare decisis. About it has grown a vast deal of
state law dealing with what constitutes postponement of "pos-
session or enjoyment." 30 Yet it should be recognized that the
tax imposed under the authority of that case is in fact a dis-
criminatory gifts tax, and not a tax upon a transfer of testa-
mentary character. If the case cannot be overruled as to suc-
cession taxes, it is to be hoped that its authority will not pre-
vail in transmission tax cases.
IV. TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
Inheritance tax statutes generally provide that property trans-
ferred by a donor in contemplation of death shall be subjected,
along with property passing under his will or by intestate suc-
cession, to the tax. When transfers are construed to be in con-
templation of death is largely a question of fact, and the cases
are as various as the particular facts involved. 31 It will be
found, however, that the decisions are unanimous in confining
the scope of the phrase "contemplation of death," as employed
in the statutes, to transfers made at a time when circumstances
are present making death a proximate consideration. The
(1926) 12 F. (2d) 625.
See note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 864, 874-86.
For exhaustive analysis of the cases, see a series of notes in the Araeri-
can Law Reports, (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1028, (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1335, (1926)
41 A. L. R. 989, (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1229.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/1
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF TRANSFERS 127
phrase is not construed to refer to transfers made by a man in
general contemplation of his mortality. Were it otherwise, the
taxation of a gift inter vivos would be made to depend upon the
subjective, and therefore uncertain, test of motive, and prac-
tically every gift to a natural object of bounty would be subject
to inquiry.
The constitutionality of the tax upon gifts in contemplation
of death, in the limited sense in which that phrase has been
employed, seems little in doubt. When, in the face of probable
approaching death from existing causes, a man makes a gift, it
is reasonable to characterize his act as testamentary.
In stating the underlying basis of the tax upon gifts in con-
templation of death, it seems, however, that the Supreme Court
has sometimes confused motive and justification, with the re-
sult of self-contradiction. Compare the following statement in
the opinion in Nichols v. Coolidge :32
Undoubtedly, Congress may require that property subse-
quently transferred in contemplation of death be treated as
part of the estate for purposes of taxation. This is neces-
sary to prevent evasion and give practical effect to the exer-
cise of admitted power, but the right is limited by the
necessity.
with the following passage from the opinion in Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin : 3
The presumption [that gifts within six years of death
were in contemplation of death] and consequent taxation are
defended upon the theory that, exercising judgment and dis-
cretion, the legislature found them necessary in order to
prevent evasion of inheritance taxes. . . . Rights guaran-
teed by the Federal Constitution are not to be so lightly
treated; they are superior to this supposed necessity. The
state is forbidden to deny due process of law or the equal
protection of the laws for any purpose whatsoever.
If, however, transfers in actual contemplation of death have
characteristics in common with transfers at death, so as to
justify the inclusion of the former with the latter in one scheme
of taxation,-if there is testamentary character,--constitutional
objections disappear. Such seems to be the case.
'Supra, note 22, 1. c. 542.
'Supra, note 6, 1. c. 240.
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This, however, does not means that the "contemplation of
death" clauses of the statutes are free from constitutional
problems. Three very interesting problems exist notwithstand-
ing the acceptance of the general principle of their validity:
(1) These clauses, too, contain a problem of retrospective
operation. Suppose the taxing statute be enacted intervening
the date of a gift in contemplation of death and the date of the
donor's death. It may conceivably be held that the gift, though
testamentary in character, has become vested, and the taxing
statute is bad so far as it is retrospective. On this point the
passage from Nichols v. Coolidge, just quoted, is interesting,
if not instructive, for it will be observed that the Court imputes
to Congress the power to tax gifts "subsequently transferred"
in contemplation of death. However, so long as a statute does
not by its express terms impose a tax on transfers made prior to
its enactment, it will be construed as not having retrospective
effect,3 4 and hence the constitutional issue will not arise except
in the case of such statutes where retroactive intent is plainly
declared.
(2) As in the case of postponement of "possession or enjoy-
ment," there is, pertinent to the "contemplation of death"
clauses, a problem of valuation. Suppose a man, ill of an in-
curable disease, and contemplative of his death as a result of it,
transferred shares of General Motors stock to his children;
after the transfer, but before the donor's death, let us assume
that the stock doubled in value. May the state tax the value as
of the date of death? To do so would be to tax values which did
not exist at the time of the transfer, and which the beneficiaries
did not receive by virtue thereof. Even more pointed would be
the case of a trust fund transferred in contemplation of death,
which had increased in value, prior to the donor's death, due to
investment and reinvestment, for here the measure of the tax
would be property which was never transferred.2
(3) States have not been content merely to enact that gifts
made in contemplation of death should be subject to succession
taxes, but, confronted with the difficulty of proof of such con-
templation, have created statutory presumptions that gifts
"Shwab v. Doyle (1922) 258 U. S. 529.
See note (1926) 40 HARV. L. REv. 118.
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made within a certain period prior to death were made in con-
templation of death. Where these presumptions are fact pre-
sumptions, they merely constitute rules of evidence, and it is
unlikely that they will be declared invalid. As was said in
Mobile Railroad Company v. Turnipseed: 8
Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall con-
stitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but
to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general
power of government.
But suppose that the presumption created by the statute be a
presumption of law. Such was the situation in Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin,37 where the Supreme Court of the United States de-
clared invalid (as applied to a transfer not in fact made in con-
templation of death) a clause in a Wisconsin taxing statute,
which provided that every transfer made by a donor within six
years prior to his death, of a material portion of his estate, with-
out adequate valuable consideration, should be construed to have
been made in contemplation of death. In the court's view, the
tax was not sustainable as one on succession at death, since the
gift was not made with actual testamentary intent. The pur-
pose of preventing evasion of the succession tax was not re-
garded by the court as constitutional justification for a tax
otherwise bad.
We can only speculate as to the validity of a presumption,
based upon a shorter period of time. In a dissenting opinion in
the Schlesinger ease, Mr. Justice Holmes inferred that a six
months' presumption would undoubtedly be held good. Logi-
cally the reasoning of the majority opinion would seem to pre-
clude any conclusive presumption whatsoever. However, con-
flicting principles have often created constitutional limitations,
which are not in conformity with logical deductions from any
one principle. Constitutional law, by its very nature, defies the
support of a framework of pure syllogism.
V. TRANSFERS IN EXERCISE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The effect of powers of revocation reserved in instruments
of gift inter vivos has been discussed supra. It will be recalled
(1910) 219 U. S. 35.Supra, note 6.
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that in Saltonstall v. Saltonstall,8 statutory authority for the
tax, imposed with respect to property transferred subject to
such a power, was found by the state court in a clause of the
Massachusetts succession tax law governing transfers in exer-
cise, or upon default of exercise, of powers of appointment. In
the construction placed by the state court upon its statute, the
Supreme Court of the United States was bound to acquiesce.
Based upon considerations already mentioned it found the tax
upon transfers subject to a reserved power in the donor valid.
But what shall be said of the constitutionality of such a tax-
ing statute, where the power is not in the nature of a reserva-
tion by the donor, but is conferred upon another, a "donee"?
The incidence of the tax now under consideration is upon trans-
mission by, or succession from, the donee, and not the donor.
So far as the donor is concerned no further tax is exigible. If
the power was conferred by a deed of gift containing no reser-
vations and made without contemplation of death, the transfer
creating the power would not be subject to inheritance taxes.
If the power was conferred by will, gift subject to revocation, or
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at,
or in contemplation of, death, the entire property so passing, in-
cluding the estates therein subject to appointment, will pre-
sumably have been taxed as part of the estate of, or succession
from, the donor of the power.
Under succession tax laws, states can discriminate between
the interests created under a taxable transfer, so as to impose
the tax on presently vested interests at the time of the testator's
or donor's death, and reserve the imposition of the tax on con-
tingent interests until the time of their vestiture.' Probably a
like discrimination between interests defined by the will or deed,
and those subject to appointment would be permissible. This
situation, however, assumes the power to tax the entire suc-
cession from the donor and the postponement of the full exercise
of the power to tax until appointment by the donee. The solu-
tion of the problem involves the validity of a classification,
rather than the power to tax the transfer. In the case now
under consideration, the full exercise of, or failure to exercise,
Supra, note 11.
Solomon v. State Tax Commission (1929) 278 U. S. 484.
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the power to tax the estate of, or succession from, the donor of
the power is assumed, and the problem is one of the constitu-
tionality of a tax imposed by virtue of the exercise by the donee,
or his failure to exercise, the power.
In Orr v. Gilman 4 and Chanler v. Kelsey,4' the Supreme
Court had before it for consideration Laws of New York, 1897,
Chapter 284:
Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a
power of appointment derived from any disposition of prop-
erty, made either before or after the passage of this act,
such appointment, when made, shall be deemed a transfer
taxable, under the provisions of this act, in the same man-
ner as though the property to which such appointment re-
lates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power, and
had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will; and
whenever any person or corporation possessing such a
power of appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exer-
cise the same within the time provided therefor, in whole or
in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act
shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such omissions
or failure, in the same manner as though the persons or
corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or
enjoyment of the property to which such power related had
succeeded thereto by a will of the donee of the power fail-
ing to exercise such power, taking effect at the time of such
omission or failure.
In the Orr case, one David Dows, by will, probated prior to the
enactment of the statute, conferred upon his son the power to
appoint by will certain property among the children of the
donee. The power was exercised after the enactment of the
statute. In the Chanler case, William B. Astor made; long be-
fore the enactment, transfers of real estate and personal prop-
erty upon trust for the benefit of a daughter during her life,
remainder to her issue, remainder should she die without issue
to her surviving brothers and sisters and their issue, with power
on the part of the life tenant, by deed or will, to apportion among
the classes named. The daughter died without issue, and by
will, probated after the enactment of the statute, appointed the
property to certain of her collateral kindred. Except as to the
(1902) 183 U. S. 278.
(1907) 205 U. S. 466.
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manner in which the power might be exercised, the two cases
were in their essentials alike, and in both cases the court sus-
tained the tax imposed under the above quoted law.
In Chanler v. Kelsey, Mr. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Moody, wherein he ex-
pressed his view that the tax was bad as a succession tax, be-
cause "there was no succession for it to operate upon." Since
the justification for a succession tax, he reasoned, lay in the
privilege of succession, accorded by the state through its Statute
of Wills and laws of descent, no succession tax could constitu-
tionally be imposed where that privilege was not requisite to
pass the title. Orr v. Gilman was distinguished on the ground
that there the power could only have been exercised by will,
whereas in Chanler v. Kelsey the donor had provided that other
ways of exercising the power might be employed. It is not
often that Mr. Justice Holmes has voted against the states on
tax questions. Even here he qualified his statement that there
was no succession by basing it on the possibility of exercise of
the power by deed. There was, however, in the dissenting
opinion a note of prophecy.
The gist of the majority opinions in the two cases under con-
sideration was that, however technically correct it might be to
say that the appointed estate came from the donor and not from
the donee of the power, yet it was only upon the exercise of the
power that the estate of the appointees became complete.4 2 Ac-
cording to the law of New York, it was then only that the estate
vested in the appointees."
The position was not without difficulty. When, as in Salton-
stall v. Saltonstall, the completion of the transfer occurs by rea-
son of the donor's death and his failure to revoke, a succession
takes place at that time. But in each of the cases under con-
sideration, a succession took place at the death of the donor,
which the state had full power to tax at that time. Whether it
exercised such power through a succession tax law then in force,
or not, seems immaterial. By the appointment clauses of its
statute, the state then undertook to impose another tax when
the remainders became vested by exercise of the power of ap-
"Supra, note 42, 1. c. 473.
Supra, note 40, 1. c. 282.
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pointment. Had the remainders become vested by the hap-
pening of a contingency, instead of by the act of the donee of
the power, it would be more apparent that the vesting related
back to the original deed or will. The principle, however, in
the contingent remainder and appointment cases, seems the
same, namely, that vesting is not tantamount to succession.
- It must be noticed, however, that the appointments in the
Orr and Chanler cases were both made by will. In the Chanler
case, it might have been made by deed, and if such had been the
case, it would have been apparent that the vesting of the estates
in the appointees bore no relation to the death of anyone so as
to constitute a succession at death. Does the manner of exer-
cise, viz., by will, make any difference? While it is true that the
state Statute of Wills is called into operation as a test of the
validity of the appointment, it is also true that it is called into
operation by the donor of the power who might have stipulated
for a will executed according to the laws of Timbuktu, rather
than according to the laws of the taxing state. The fact that
the appointment is required to be by will owes its significance to
the act of the donor of the power, and not to the privilege ac-
corded by the laws of the taxing state to appointees to succeed
to the property of the donee of the power. The donee had no
fee in the property. The tax on the exercise of the power of
appointment by the donee seems to be something other than a
succession tax, and to include the property passing thereunder
with the property of the donee of the power for succession tax
purposes, seems arbitrary.44
After two decades of silence and a change in the personnel of
the Supreme Court came Wachovia Bank and Trust Company v.
Doughton,'5 which represents the present current of Supreme
Court decision. That case involved the power of the State of
North Carolina, under a statute similar to the New York statute
above quoted, to tax the exercise by one of its citizens of a power
of appointment created by the will of a Massachusetts decedent,
who died before the enactment of the North Carolina statute.
The property subject to appointment was held by a Massa-
"For a treatment of these cases from the standpoint of retroactivity, see
Julius H. Amberg in (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rsv. 691, at 700.
(1926) 272 U. S. 567.
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chusetts trust company upon trust to pay the income thereof to
the donee of the power during her lifetime, and the corpus to
whomsoever she should appoint by will. The power was exer-
cised by the donee by will duly probated in North Carolina. It
was held that the tax sought to be imposed was unconstitutional
as to the appointment in question.
There are two differences between this case and the Orr and
Chanter cases. In the first place, the power of appointment
was general and not limited to certain classes of relatives of the
donee as in both of the earlier cases. This might have been con-
sidered as vesting in the donee, for taxing purposes, an equitable
fee, which passed as part of the property of the donee. The
court, however, did not touch upon this point. In the second
place, the last residence of the donor of the power and of the
trustee were outside the State of North Carolina. Since the
North Carolina statute in question does not purport to tax the
succession from the donor, but taxes the property as if it were
property of the donee of the power, residence of the donor would
not seem to make any difference. It is, however, the residence
of the trustee and the presence of the property in Massachusetts,
upon which the court distinguishes the Orr and Chanler cases.
Said the court :46
A state may not subject to taxation things wholly beyond
her jurisdiction and control.
If this were the only significance of the Wachovia Bank case, it
might well be relegated to the problem of state jurisdiction over
property for succession tax purposes.47 It would not belong to
the subject matter of this paper.
However, intangible personal property (of which the fund
consisted) is taxable at the domicile of its owner,48 and it was
necessary for the court to decide that the property in question
was not the property of the donee of the power in order to reach
the conclusion that the property was not in North Carolina. Ac-
cording to the laws of the State of Massachusetts, the court held,
property, over which one has a power of appointment, is not the
Supra, note 45, 1. c. 575.
" Discussion of this feature of the inheritance tax laws by this writer will
be found in (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 99.
' Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1.
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property of the donee, but of the donor of the power. Hence,
the real basis of the decision must have been that no succession
occurred at the death of the donee of the power.
It is very interesting that the court omitted discussion of the
donee's will as an act whereby the estates of the appointees be-
came vested. Yet it is submitted that that act was as pertinent
to the power of taxation in the Wachovia Bank case as in the
Chanler case.
It is the conviction of the writer that the earlier cases were
decided upon principles which are unsound and which have been
at least partially repudiated by the court in the Wachovia Bank
case. The act of vestiture upon which the older cases relied is
not tantamount to the creation of a succession. A tax upon the
exercise of the power of appointment is not a succession tax.
So far as the taxing statute included property passing by ap-
pointment, with property owned by the donee of the power, in
the computation of the tax, it treated the former as if it also
were property of the donee, a premise which the Wachovia Bank
case denied, and taxed as a succession at the death of the donee
something as to which the appointees did not succeed the donee.
VI. SUMMARY
Extensions of the inheritance tax laws to include transfers
not taking place at the death of the original transferor have been
motivated by the desire to prevent circumvention. The reason-
ableness of an extension to accomplish that end ought. not, how-
ever, to be the test of its constitutionality. Rights under the
due process clause are, as has been said, superior to the necessi-
ties of legislation.
In searching for the test of constitutionality due regard
should be paid the doctrinal basis of inheritance taxation. This
type of taxation, as well as the mode of imposition and discrimi-
nation held permissible, has been postulated upon the nature of
an inheritance tax as a tax upon a privilege granted by the
sovereign. To extend the tax so as to embrace transfers not
made in exercise of that privilege would amount to supporting
one tax by the justification for another.
To include property passing by virtue of transfers inter vivos,
or in exercise of powers of appointment, in the estate of a dece-
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dent for inheritance tax purposes would seem to fail of justi-
fication, unless the testamentary character of such a transfer
bring it within the reason supporting the inheritance tax. If a
disposition by reason of surrounding circumstances or in accord-
ance with its own terms accomplishes substantially the same re-
sult as would have been accomplished by a will, the tax seems
constitutionally permissible, but not otherwise.
In the treatment of the various subdivisions of our topic the
cases have been found, in the main, to have been consistent with
the test herein submitted. However, it has been found difficult
to reconcile Keeney v. New York, Orr v. Gilman and Chanler
v. Kelsey with a test formulated on the basis of the nature of
inheritance taxation. The Supreme Court seems, in these in-
stances, to have permitted the reasonableness of the state's
motive to overcome considerations of principle. The doctrines
of these cases have been partially repudiated in Nichols 'v. Cool-
idge and Wachovia Bank and Trust Company v. Doughton.
Whether the reasoning in the later cases will be extended to en-
gulf the earlier doctrines, forms one of the interesting problems
of contemporary constitutional law.
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